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Bug #5065

closed

In shared or administrative installations, the ability to store modules.txt and extra modules locally. This way, the module manager will work smoothly on Windows without having to run as an administrator.

Added by David Welker almost 14 years ago. Updated over 13 years ago.

Status:
Resolved
Priority:
Normal
Assignee:
Category:
general
Target version:
Start date:
06/30/2010
Due date:
% Done:

0%

Estimated time:
Bugzilla-Id:
5065

Description

(1) In shared or administrative installations, the ability to store modules.txt and extra modules locally. This way, the module manager will work smoothly on Windows without having to run as an administrator.

Problem: The file modules.txt is read by Kepler to determine which modules are active. Both modules.txt and local modules are currently stored in the installation area, which in shared installations is read-only. Because extra modules are executed, security might dictate that in shared installation situations modules.txt not be changed and new modules not be downloaded. This was the original rationale for going forward with our current design However, on Windows, the default for installations appears to be to install as an administrator. As a result, even in private non-shared installations on Windows, it can be difficult to use the Module Manager. To do so, a user must remember to run as an administrator, which gives Kepler the ability to write to the installation area.

Solution 1: Store modules.txt and download new modules not to the installation area, but to a designated location in the users home where write access will be available. The downside of this approach is that this would decrease the security of truly shared installations of Kepler. On the other hand, a problem with malicious modules may be more theoretical than real at this point, as modules are now published and retrieved from a centralized source that we control. Also, if there is a problem with malicious modules, it would affect not just shared installations, but individual installations; protecting shared installations does nothing to protect individual installations which are perhaps just as important. Also, the real risk of malicious modules is low, given current development patterns.

Solution 2: Try to find a way so that Windows installations are not done by default on Windows. This may or may not be possible.

Solution 3: Warn users who do not have appropriate write permissions to the installation area that they may not use the Module Manager. The design of such a warning should be thought through so that it is non-intrusive and graceful. For example, it probably should not pop-up at start-up, but only when the user attempts to invoke Module Manager functionality.

Conclusion: At the very least, users who cannot use the Module Manager due to lack of permission to write to where Kepler has been installed should be warned. Perhaps even better, given the prevalence of this problem in Windows and relatively low security risks, modules.txt and new module downloads should occur in a local area that is writable.


Related issues

Blocked by Kepler - Bug #5064: Kepler 2.1 Tracking BugNewDavid Welker06/30/2010

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